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This is not the book it should have been. Unfortunately, it is not even
the book it once was. Marvin Frankel introduced the theme and most of
the substance of Partisan Justice' in his 1974 Cardozo Lecture to the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York. That lecture became an
article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2 and Mr. Frankel
then wrote three articles elaborating on the same theme.' Those four
pieces, slightly revised, have been gathered together to form the present
book.
When the Cardozo Lecture was first presented, many of us felt a sense
of excitement and anticipation. Mr. Frankel, then a highly respected fed-
eral district judge, was known for his keen and searching mind and for his
eloquent and forthright style of expression. The engagement of those tal-
ents in the scholarly discussion of lawyers' professional responsibilities,
which had begun in earnest less than a decade before,4 was a significant
occasion. Since then, Mr. Frankel's views and analysis have become even
more consequential, for in 1977 he became an influential member of the
ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. That body,
referred to as the Kutak Commission (for its Chairman, Robert J.
Kutak), has undertaken to draft a new set of Model Rules of Professional
t- Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School. Professor Freedman is the Reporter and principal drafts-
man of the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (Reporters' Draft Aug. 1981).
1. M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
3. M. FRANKEL, JUSTICE: COMMODITY OR PUBLIC SERVICE (1978); Frankel, The Adversary
Judge, 54 TEX. L. REV. 465 (1976); Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 516 (1976).
4. See Symposium-Professional Responsibility, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). There have
probably been more substantive articles and books on lawyers' responsibilities published in the past
one and one-half decades than had been written in the previous one and one-half centuries.
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Conduct5 to replace the ABA's current Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity.' Because of his early and leading role in discussing the issues and
because of his important present position, Mr. Frankel had both a respon-
sibility and an opportunity to make a major advance in the debate about
lawyers' ethics. It is disappointing, therefore, that he has not taken on the
crucial issues in the controversy.
As the title of his book indicates, Mr. Frankel has some strongly nega-
tive attitudes towards the adversary system. Mr. Frankel acknowledges
that the "vital premise" of the adversary system is that "partisan advocacy
on both sides" is the best way to discover the truth.7 The "thesis of this
book," however, is that "the American version of the adversary process
places too low a value on truth telling" and that the process allows us "too
often to sacrifice truth to other values that are inferior, or even illusory."'
His proposals for change, the author concedes, are "fairly basic"' and
even "radical":10 they are directed to "breaking the adversary mold"1' and
would therefore effect an "appreciable revolution"" in lawyers' profes-
sional responsibilities to their clients.
In his initial essay into lawyers' ethics in 1974, Mr. Frankel was un-
derstandably tentative in putting forth his suggestions for revolutionary
reform. His first article made "no pretense to be polished or finished wis-
dom"; it was intended merely "'to suggest problems and raise doubts,
rather than to resolve confusion; to disturb thought, rather than to dis-
pense legal or moral truth.'" The modest purpose was only to "sketch"
some "tenative lines" along which efforts to reform the adversary system
"might" proceed." Moreover, Mr. Frankel conceded that it is "strongly
arguable . . . that a simplistic preference for the truth may not comport
with more fundamental ideals-including notably the ideal that generally
5. ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (Sixth Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES].




10. P. 83. The author puts the word in quotation marks, but not, apparently, by way of
disclaimer.
11. P. 100.
12. P. 83. In view of those candid avowals, it is difficult to credit the author's profession of "a
profound devotion to a soundly adversary mode of reaching informed decisions." P. 9. Mr. Frankel
adds, in an understatement, that a "volume could be written on the consequent changes in procedure,
in client-lawyer relations, and on the lawyer's self-image," if his views were to be fully adopted. P.
83.
13. Frankel, supra note 2, at 1031 (quoting Judge Charles E. Clark from Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 268-69
(1946)).
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values individual freedom and dignity above order and efficiency in
government."14
Such candid disclaimers and generous concessions certainly tended to
disarm criticism. Invited to comment at the time, I observed that one could
hardly fault Mr. Frankel for failing to identify, in his initial, tenative
effort, all of the values he might have had in mind." Nevertheless, I felt
constrained to note that before we proceeded to modify our tradi-
tional-that is, our constitutional-system for administering justice, we
must assess what values would have to be given a higher or lower priority
than under our current system." I concluded the comment by urging Mr.
Frankel to indicate which constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments his proposals would subordinate, and how we
could achieve his proposed modifications of the adversary system without
doing irreparable damage to some of the most precious aspects of our form
of government.' 7
In publishing his book some six years later, Mr. Frankel has failed to
meet that challenge. His failure is all the more noteworthy because, for
three years now, he has served as a member of the Kutak Commission,
participating in extensive deliberations on the very questions addressed in
his book.' s In fact, Mr. Frankel recognizes his obligation to identify in
detail the constitutional values at stake, and he promises to meet it. Refer-
ring to interests that are commonly said to outweigh truth as an absolute
goal-"interests in privacy, personal dignity, security, autonomy, and
other cherished values"-he asserts that "[tihe problem of how to weigh
the competing values is, obviously, at the heart of the concerns to be ad-
dressed in these chapters. ' " Immediately following that assertion, Mr.
Frankel states the thesis of his book-that we have too often sacrificed
truth to "other values that are inferior, or even illusory."2
Surely those are strong words to use in describing admittedly "cher-
ished values." Which are inferior? Which illusory? If those values are "at
the heart of the concerns . . . addressed" in the book, one would expect
intensive analysis of them. Yet Mr. Frankel gives us almost none. He tells
us a great deal about lawyers' "excesses-the tricks, stratagems, dodges
and ruses that wily advocates everywhere have learned and employed...
14. Id. at 1056-57 (footnote omitted).
15. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1062 (1975).
16. Id. at 1063.
17. Id. at 1066.
18. P. 80. The author continues to describe his work as being "more to raise questions than to
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to win unfairly, take unfair advantage, and achieve unjust results."'"
He includes barely a paragraph, however, describing in positive terms the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel;" he refers only in passing to the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination;23 and he makes scant if
any reference to privacy, personal dignity, autonomy, and other funda-
mental rights24 that gain their vitality from the adversary system.
I continue to believe that the burden is fairly on those who propose
"radical" or "revolutionary" changes in the adversary system to demon-
strate the constitutional implications and propriety of those changes. Ap-
parently, however, Mr. Frankel and his colleagues on the Kutak Commis-
sion, in dealing with lawyers' professional responsibilities, are determined
to ignore those fundamental aspects of positive law.2s If the discussion is to
proceed on a constitutional level, therefore, those of us who are concerned
that radical departures from the adversary system will undermine basic
values are going to have to put those values in issue.
II
Mr. Frankel directs his attack on the adversary system principally
against lawyer-client confidences. He recommends rules that would effect
a "pervasive broadening of the [lawyer's] duty to reveal truth, even when
it hurts."26 A lawyer, having elicited a client's confidences, is to use the
information to the detriment of the client's interests as the client perceives
them. If the lawyer learns that the client is going to commit perjury, the




24. Mr. Frankel does acknowledge, with a tinge of sarcasm, that the adversary system is "cher-
ished as an ideal of constitutional proportions" in part bedause "it embodies the fundamental right to
be heard." P. 12.
25. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reporter of the Kutak Commission, recently addressed
what bearing positive law has on rules of professional conduct. Address by Geoffrey Hazard, Baron
de Hirsch Meyer Lecture, Miami University Law School (Apr. 3, 1981). In his prepared text, Profes-
sor Hazard referred at length to the law of agency and torts, with citations to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency (1958). He made no reference at all, however, to any aspect of constitutional law and
at no point cited the Bill of Rights.
26. P. 81.
27. Id. This proposal was adopted by the Kutak Commission. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, §
3.1(a)(3), at 59. Neither Mr. Frankel nor the Kutak Commission tells the lawyer how to carry out
that obligation. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27-41 (1975) (it is
impossible in some circumstances for lawyer to meet obligation to refuse to offer perjurious testimony
without violating other obligations). The Comment to section 3.1 of the Model Rules explicitly rejects
the method recommended in ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE.
LATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTIONS 167 (App. Draft 1971) (§7.7
of the standards relating to the defense function) on grounds similar to those expressed in M. FREED-
MAN, supra, at 27-41. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, § 3.1, Comment, at 63. In 1979 the ABA
House of Delegates approved the Standards Relating to the Defense Function but rejected § 7.7.
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lawyer is to divulge the client's confidences in order to rectify the false-
hood.2 8 If the client does not testify at all, but has confidentially revealed
to the lawyer facts that would probably have a substantial effect on the
determination of an issue material to the client's case, the lawyer is to give
the information to the court, even though doing so is contrary to the cli-
ent's interests and,instructions.29
Such rules would profoundly, and adversely, affect the lawyer-client re-
lationship, the adversary system, and clients' fundamental rights20 Clients
seeking to exercise their right to counsel would be able to do so only at the
risk of compromising their privacy, autonomy,3 and privilege against self-
incrimination. Clients concerned to protect those rights-a class of people
that includes the innocent as well as the guilty-could do so only by
forfeiting in large part their right to counsel. That forced choice is wrong,
for "[w]hen the exercise of one right is made contingent upon the forbear-
ance of another, both rights are corrupted. '32
Let us first consider a case that would appear to be a compelling one
for requiring the attorney to disclose the truth.3 3 Fiorillo was indicted for
committing perjury before a grand jury. The indictment alleged that he
had falsely denied having had certain telephone conversations with Vone.
Soon after the indictment, the United States Attorney received "competent
and reliable information" that Fiorillo and his attorney, Terkeltoub, had
met with Vone for three hours and had attempted to obstruct justice by
inducing Vone to testify at the pending perjury trial that the conversations
specified in the Fiorillo perjury indictment had not taken place. The
United States Attorney therefore sought testimony from Terkeltoub before
a grand jury inquiring into the attempted obstruction of justice .3
The testimony sought was not protected by the traditional attorney-cli-
ent privilege, the court said, both because it related to a meeting with a
28. P. 81. This proposal was adopted by the Kutak Commission. See MODEL RULES, supra note
5, § 3.1(b), at 59-60.
29. P. 83. This proposal was rejected by a majority of the Kutak Commission. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 5, § 3.1, Comment, at 63.
30. Mr. Frankel makes no distinction in his book between criminal and civil cases, suggesting that
he sees none of significance. He does note in passing that the rules in the Kutak Commission's Model
Rules that reflect his proposals would apply "at least" in civil cases. P. 81. In fact, the Model Rules
provide an exception to the required divulgence of confidences in criminal cases only insofar as "appli-
cable law requires" that the attorney proceed without divulging confidences. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 5, § 3.1(f), at 60-61. Neither Mr. Frankel nor the Kutak Commission tells the lawyer what
applicable law requires, although Mr. Kutak has repeatedly stated that the Model Rules would
"clearly differentiate right from wrong" and tell lawyers "'exactly what they ought to do.'" See, e.g.,
Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 6, 1979, at 28, cols. 1, 4 (quoting Robert J. Kutak).
31. For an extended discussion of the client's autonomy when it comes into conflict with the
attorney's values, see Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U.L.
REV. 191 (1978).
32. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1977).
33. In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
34. See id. at 683-84.
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third party and because it dealt with a conversation allegedly amounting
to, or looking toward, the commission of a crime. 5 The government's de-
mands for truth, the court added, carried with them "the heavy weight of
history and public need commanding that the grand jury's investigations
be as unfettered as possible." 6 Moreover, the court noted, "the Govern-
ment comes here with the laudable purpose of guarding against suspected
attacks on the integrity of the judicial process itself." 7
Nevertheless, Judge Marvin Frankel held that attorney Terkeltoub was
"not only entitled, but probably required, to withhold answers to the
grand jury's questions."' 8 Judge Frankel explained: "it bears emphasis
that while the witness before us is a lawyer, the crucial interests at stake
belong to the whole community."' He then quoted with approval from
Justice Jackson's opinion in Hickman v. Taylor,0 a civil case: "the law-
yer and the law office are indispensable parts of our administration of
justice . . . . The welfare and tone of the legal profession is therefore of
prime consequence to society, which would feel the consequences of...
[disclosure requirements] impairing the lawyer's effective representation of
his client."'"
Judge Frankel noted further that privacy is "vital" to the lawyer's
preparation, and that the prosecution is therefore constitutionally forbid-
den to eavesdrop on or to plant agents to hear the councils of the defense."'
The ultimate interest to be protected is the privacy and confidentiality of
the lawyer's work in preparing the case. That protection would be "a thin
illusion if the Government could have for the asking what it has, in rare
lapses, sought by less genteel means.""' Even in civil litigation, Judge
Frankel added, "'an exception to the policy underlying the privacy of [the
attorney's] professional activities'" will be justified "only in a 'rare
situation.' ""
Did Judge Frankel suffer a "misunderstanding [of] the ethical canons,"
or a "misconceiving [of] the adversary prbcess"? s If not, what explains
Mr. Frankel's current proposal that the government (or any other adverse
party) should receive without even asking what it has been denied upon
35. Id. at 684 n.2.




40. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
41. In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
42. Id. at 685.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 686 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947)).
45. P. 76.
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formal motion and affidavit? Mr. Frankel, of course, is entitled to change
his mind, but the readers of his book deserve an explication of the consti-
tutional values he once characterized as vital and indispensable-values
that he found sufficiently compelling to justify subordination of the search
for truth.
The Supreme Court has explicitly linked lawyers' responsibilities to cli-
ents' constitutional rights. That linkage rests on the court's understanding
that "[t]he Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper
method of determining guilt."'"6
The most obvious constitutional component of the adversary system is
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which the Supreme Court has
called "fundamental and essential"47 and which has been described as the
"most fundamental right" because it affects the ability to assert any other
right one might have.4 At the same time, the Court has characterized the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as "the essential
mainstay of our adversary system." 4' Both of those constitutional rights
underlie, and are protected by, the lawyer-client privilege of
confidentiality."
A few key cases should suffice to point up the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of the constitutional obstacles to adopting Mr. Frankel's proposals. In
Trammel v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that the lawyer-
client privilege rests on the need for the lawyer-not only as advocate, but
as counsellor-to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking
representation."1 The privilege is therefore "rooted in the imperative need
for confidence and trust" between lawyer and client.12 Without that confi-
dence and trust, and the full communication that flows from it, the lawyer
cannot carry out his or her professional responsibilities. 3 In short, violat-
ing confidentiality deprives the client of effective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment.
In Fisher v. United States, 4 the Supreme Court considered "whether
the attorney-client privilege applies to documents in the hands of an attor-
46. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).
47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
48. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
50. Cf United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications between the accused and
his attorney.")
51. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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ney which would have been privileged in the hands of the client by reason
of the Fifth Amendment.""5 In answering the question in the affirmative,
the Court noted that the lawyer-client privilege is recognized in order "to
encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys."'" The Court
went on to make the following common-sense observation:
As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information
could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclo-
sure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would
be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to ob-
tain fully informed legal advice.5 7
As that statement indicates, the Court has, in Professor Whitebread's
words, "extended Fifth Amendment protection to the attorney-client privi-
lege for the express purpose of encouraging the uninhibited exchange of
information between citizens and their attorneys.""8
Finally, in Upjohn Co. v. United States," the Supreme Court wrote
that the attorney-client privilege is "'founded upon the necessity'" of le-
gal counsel,10 that knowledge of all facts is "'essential to proper represen-
tation,' ,,65 and that the assistance of counsel "'can only be safely and
readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of
disclosure.' ",'2 That case and others 3 underscore the Court's view that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination together give constitutional expression to the ad-
versary system, and that each gives constitutional basis to the lawyer-cli-
ent privilege of confidentiality.
55. Id. at 402.
56. Id. at 403.
57. Id.
58. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 257 (1980). See also Seidelson, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Client's Constitutional Rights, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693 (1978).
59. 49 U.S.L.W. 4093 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981).
60. Id. at 4094 (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
61. Id. at 4095 (quoting ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION
4-1 (1969)).
62. Id. at 4094 (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
63. For example, in United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980), the Court permitted the
government to impeach a defendant by using evidence that was unavailable in the government's case
in chief because of the exclusionary rule. The court stated that "truth is a fundamental goal of our
legal system," and that "when defendants testify, they must testify truthfully or suffer the conse-
quences." Id. at 1916. Those consequences include, as the Court had said in Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971), "the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances," which is the "tradi-
tional truth-testing [device] of the adversary process." Id. at 225-26. It is significant that, despite the
Court's assumption that perjury was presented in both Havens and Harris, the Court did not suggest
in either case that counsel had acted improperly in not disclosing it. Cf New Jersey v. Portash, 99 S.
Ct. 1292 (1979) (defendant had right to testify in his defense without being impeached through use of
his own materially inconsistent grand jury testimony, which had been elicited under grant of
immunity).
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Other policies that underlie lawyer-client confidentiality-derived from
the Constitution and from other legal sources-must also be addresed by
anyone proposing radical changes in the confidentiality privilege. Citizens
in our society are governed by extensive and complex laws and regula-
tions; they therefore require legal assistance in understanding their rights
and obligations and in achieving equal protection of the laws. Confidential
legal counsel thus benefits citizens in their encounters with law. It also
benefits society. The lawyer who has been taken fully into the client's
confidence is thereby in a position to counsel the client to act in socially
desirable ways, when, without the benefit of an attorney's advice, the cli-
ent might act improperly.
Professor Charles Fried has pointed out an additional value embodied
in lawyer-client confidentiality. He has explained that our social institu-
tions are so complex that, without the assistance of an expert adviser, a
lay person cannot exercise the personal autonomy to which he or she is
morally and constitutionally entitled. "Without such an adviser," he has
noted, "the law would impose constraints on the lay citizen (unequally at
that) which it is not entitled to impose explicity."" Thus, the lawyer's
purpose is "to preserve and foster the client's autonomy within the law."'
Professor Sylvia A. Law echoed those ideas when she wrote:
A lawyer has a special skill and power to enable individuals to know
the options available to them in dealing with a particular problem,
and to assist individuals in wending their way through bureaucratic,
legislative or judicial channels to seek vindication for individual
claims and interests. Hence, lawyers have a special ability to en-
hance human autonomy and self-control."
In Upjohn Co., the Supreme Court recognized those values served by
the privilege of confidentiality. The Court observed that the privilege em-
braces both the advice given by the lawyer, and the information that must
be given to the lawyer "to enable him to give sound and informed ad-
vice."'' 7 In addition, the Court quoted with approval Ethical Consideration
4-I of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibilt
.
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is
handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our
legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent
64. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976).
65. Id.
66. Law, Afterword: The Purpose of Professional Education, in LOOKING AT LAW SCHOOL 205,
212 (S. Gillers ed. 1977).
67. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 49 U.S.L.W. 4093, 4095 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981).
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professional judgment to separate the relevant and the important
from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical
obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of
his client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to
proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to
seek early legal assistance. 8
The Court added that a broad protection of confidentiality serves to foster
sound advice and valuable efforts by counsel to ensure the client's compli-
ance with the law. 9
Thus, the lawyer's role-in civil and criminal practice, in counseling
and in litigating-remains critically important to the rights of citizens in a
free society. Justice Jackson summed it up when he observed: "[law-abid-
ing people can go nowhere else [but to the lawyer] to learn the ever
changing and constantly multiplying rules by which they must behave and
to obtain redress for their wrongs."7" So too did Justice Stevens: "the law-
yer is the essential medium through which the demands and commitments
of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen."7 That crucial role
would be undermined by rules that impaired the relationship of confi-
dence and trust between lawyer and client.
Marvin Frankel's proposals in Partisan Justice are fundamentally in-
consistent with the constitutional components of the adversary system, and
with the values and policies to which they give meaning. A lawyer cannot
establish a relationship of confidence and trust while giving the client a
Miranda warning.72 As acknowledged by the Kutak Commission: "The
warning may lead the client to withhold or falsify relevant facts, thereby
making the lawyer's representation . . . less effective."7 Moreover, even
if such a warning were not given, it would not be long before the public
became aware that the lawyer is a conduit of confidences to the court and
to adverse parties. The burden would then be upon the client to keep the
lawyer "selectively ignorant"7 4 by deciding what is incriminating and
68. Id. (quoting ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 4-1
(1969)).
69. Id. at 4095. The point is no less valid in the case of perjured testimony. Judge James G.
Exum, Jr., of the North Carolina Supreme Court, has written that "experienced defense lawyers have
pointed out time and again that, permitted to continue to counsel with their criminal clients up to the
very hour of the client's proposed testimony, they almost always were successful in persuading the
client not to take the stand to testify falsely." Exum, The Perjurious Criminal Defendant: A Solution
to His Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 SOc. RESPONSIBILITY: JOURNALISM, L., MED. 16, 20 (1980).
70. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
71. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
72. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, § 1.4(b), at 12. My objection, of course, is not to giving such
a warning. If the lawyer is going to betray the client's confidences, the client is entitled to notice. My
basic objection is to the betrayal of confidences, and to the adverse consequences of such betrayal
becoming a practice among lawyers.
73. Id. § 1.4(b), Comment, at 14.
74. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 27, at 4-5, 35-36.
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what exculpatory, and by withholding what the client believed, correctly
or incorrectly, to fall into the former category. That kind of decision, how-
ever, is uniquely the lawyer's responsibility by virtue of special training
and skills. 7
The essential fallacy of Mr. Frankel's proposal can be briefly summa-
rized. He begins with the proposition that lawyers know a great deal of
truth about their client's matters. That is accurate enough. He then pro-
ceeds to the notion that if the lawyers were to share that knowledge with
their clients' adversaries and judges, there would be more truth in the
legal system. That is wrong, or, at least, it is correct only in the short run.
The inevitable result would be that clients would withhold the less pleas-
ant and comfortable truths from their lawyers. Lawyers might then be
able to say that they were unaware of perjury or other wrongs committed
by their clients, but the incidence of such misconduct would not decrease.
Indeed, misconduct would be likely to increase, because one of the costs of
destroying confidence and trust between lawyers and clients is that law-
yers would lose the opportunity to give sound legal and moral advice
based on full knowledge of the matters entrusted to them. As a conse-
quence, our clients, and society in general, would be the losers.
75. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
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